这First Train-Tram Privatisation: 1999

这‘main event’在维多利亚时代的公共交通私有化发生在1999年,当维多利亚国有化的火车和电车系统被肯尼特政府私有化。这将它们带到一个上面的轨道特许经营模型,这些模型模型(和当时广泛地不喜欢)对于英国铁轨,甚至由许多同一个人设计(COLE 2003)。私有化的建筑师和支持者(Greig 2002,Allsop 2007)承认了与英国铁路特许经营模式的这种相似之处。肯尼特政府官员担任采用特许经营模型而不是前者会鼓励的运输社区模式‘投资与创新’通过私人运营商,而后者不会(Mees 2005)。政府还引用了将公众转移到私营部门的风险。

这original franchising created two Melbourne train operators (Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains), two Melbourne tram operators (Swanston Trams and Yarra Trams) and one regional train operator (V/Line Passenger), each in charge of a discrete set of routes. The Bayside Trains, Swanston Trams and V/Line Passenger franchises were sold to National Express, a British road coach operator. Hillside Trains was sold to Connex, a subsidiary of the French Veolia conglomerate that also operated train franchises in Britain. Yarra Trams was sold to a consortium led by Transfield Services and French company Transdev.

正式的是,基于该投标者将为最小的初始补贴提供服务,竞争地招标。在实践中,竞争的程度是值得简言的,因为全世界都有很少的公司在经营固定铁路公共交通专营机构的业务中,只有一个司法管辖区的少数人。

Kennett特许经营合同的一个重要特征是,他们提供了每年逐步下降的消费者,以至于他们设想的12 –15年终生,维多利亚时代的纳税人将共计18亿美元,而持续公开运行。该预测包括政府为服务升级成本和新的轧制股票的规定,该滚动股份被同意作为特许经营进程的一部分:这些包括在内

  • 将周日日间频率的提高到周六级别,
  • Yarra电车运营的白天离景服务的改善每10分钟,
  • 轨道电气化到Sydenham,
  • 电车延伸到棚车,
  • 额外的工作人员的就业,
  • 购买新的火车和电车。

这contracts provided for declining subsidies because they assumed patronage on the new privatised services would dramatically increase over the franchise period: by 84% for Bayside Trains, 67% for Hillside Trains, 40% for Swanston Trams and an intermediate figure for Yarra Trams (Mees 2005, Allsop 2007). Much of this increase was forecast to occur in just the first year or two of operation (and before the arrival of new rolling stock), as a result of ‘innovations’由私人运营商。

为了进一步确保快速惠顾增长,合同包括慷慨的激励付款来增加赞助:缺陷的机制,因为这种激励也可能易于运作,以奖励一个运营商从另一个运营商转移乘客’S服务。私有化的直接影响确实是旧PTC的损失’S剩余的小手势来服务集成,运营商通过自己的衣服重新设计车辆和基础设施,作为竞争对手彼此对待,并引入自己的单模票()‘Baysider’ and ‘Connector’)破坏墨尔本’S成功的多式联运票价系统。在一个阶段连接甚至产生的地图,显示只有它的火车系统的一半,好像人们永远不会想访问墨尔本的另一半’s served by the ‘wrong’火车操作员。他们甚至省略了国家快递管理的三个城市循环站!

这franchising process also established the Office of the Director of Public Transport within the Department of Infrastructure. The function of this office was to act as the legal party to the franchise contracts, and as the regulator that would oversee compliance of operators with the contract conditions. As a party to the contracts the Director was required to sign off on changes to timetables or routes, but in accordance with the franchise model there appears to have been no presumption that the Office of the Director would itself undertake any tactical service planning. The government’S表示的意图是服务改进将被驱动‘innovation’由私人运营商,而不是中央规划。但是,合同本身最初被视为商业信心,公众对其条款没有刺势。

这privatisation of 1999 also promised there would be no real increase in fares under private operation. Accordingly, the government enacted a prohibition on above-inflation fare rises (except for a one-off 5% rise to account for the introduction of the GST in the following year).


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这public transport advocacy group for Victoria, Australia